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UNDUE DEFERENCE TO STATES IN THE
2020 ELECTION LITIGATION
Joshua A. Douglas*

INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on so much of our lives, including how to run
our elections. Yet the federal courts have refused to respond appropriately to the
dilemma that many voters faced when trying to participate in the 2020 election. Instead, the courts—particularly the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal appellate
courts—invoked a narrow test that unduly defers to state election administration and
fails to protect adequately the fundamental right to vote.
In constitutional litigation, a law usually must satisfy a two-part test: (1) does
the state have an appropriate reason for the law and (2) is the law properly tailored
to achieve the state’s goals?1 A court will force a state to satisfy the first prong by
demonstrating a “compelling” interest under strict scrutiny or still an important interest
under lower intermediate-level scrutiny.2 The Court has adopted a similar test for
election litigation, using the framework from two cases, Anderson v. Celebrezze and
Burdick v. Takushi.3 If an election law imposes a severe burden on voting rights,
then the Court applies strict scrutiny review.4 But under this Anderson-Burdick
framework, when a law does not create a severe burden on voters but still impacts
the right to vote, courts must apply intermediate-level scrutiny by identifying “the
precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by
its rule” and determining “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
* Ashland, Inc.-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law, University of Kentucky
J. David Rosenberg College of Law. Thanks to Jessica Ring Amunson, Scott Bauries, Paul
Diller, Ned Foley, Olivia Morton, Jonathan Shaub, and Nick Stephanopoulos for thoughts on an
earlier draft of this Article.
1
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273–74
(2007).
2
See, e.g., id. at 1321 (stating that “[a]pplication of strict scrutiny obviously requires the
identification of compelling governmental interests. Equally plainly, what will count as a compelling interest depends on the version of the test that a court applies. An interest that suffices
as compelling under the balancing version would not necessarily pass muster under the test
that permits infringements of protected rights only to avert catastrophes. Regardless of the
version of strict scrutiny, however, the Supreme Court has frequently adopted an astonishingly
casual approach to identifying compelling interests.”).
3
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432–34 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 789 (1983).
4
See Fallon, supra note 1, at 1283.
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burden the plaintiff’s rights.”5 Six years ago, I wrote a law review article that explained how the Supreme Court has too readily deferred to states in how to run their
elections, derogating the constitutional right to vote in the process.6 “Without identifying a specific new rule, the Court has been unjustifiably deferring to state laws
regarding election administration, thereby giving states tremendous power to
regulate elections.”7 As I recounted, the Court had essentially failed to require states
to offer “precise interests” to justify a restrictive voting rule or explain why “those
interests make it necessary to burden” the right to vote.8
The problem has only become worse as a renewed, undue deference doctrine has
emerged. The Court has not explicitly overruled the Anderson-Burdick test, but its
jurisprudence and the case law from the circuit courts of appeals in 2020 demonstrates that there is little federal judicial protection for the constitutional right to vote.9
This undue deference to state legislatures and election officials helps to explain why
voting rights plaintiffs lost so many cases in the lead-up to the 2020 election.
Much commentary about these cases focused on the “Purcell Principle,” the
doctrine that tells courts not to change election rules too close to an election for fear
of creating chaos and confusion.10 As David Gans wrote, “[b]y privileging the status
quo and preventing courts from issuing remedies close to Election Day, it downgrades
the right to vote—long described as ‘preservative of all rights’—into a second-class
right, which inevitably harms the marginalized and less powerful.”11
But there is an additional, more concerning problem with these cases: they too
readily deferred to state legislatures and election officials on how to administer
elections, allowing infringements on the constitutional right to vote without sufficient justification. At times, the courts found minimal burdens on voters, while in
a few instances courts lamented that voters will probably suffer a burden on their
ability to vote but still upheld the states’ practices because of a perceived need to
defer.12 Courts blindly said that election administration is the province of the state
legislature or credited general assertions of the goal to ensure “election integrity,”
without more.13 There was also a reinvigoration of the “independent state legislature” doctrine, which posits that state legislatures have plenary power to regulate
5

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
See generally Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U.
L. REV. 553 (2015) [hereinafter Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections].
7
Id. at 553.
8
Id. at 554; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2006) (per curiam); David Gans, The Roberts
Court, The Shadow Docket, and the Unraveling of Voting Rights Remedies, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY ISSUE BRIEF 1 (Oct. 2020); Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell
Principle, 43 FLA. ST. L. REV. 427, 428 (2017).
11
Gans, supra note 10, at 4.
12
See infra Part II.
13
See infra Part II.
6
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federal elections without interference from state courts.14 Ultimately, the protection
of the right to vote turned into an undue deference standard, one that places a thumb
on the scale of states, especially as an election draws near. Thus, the problem is not
only that courts applied the Purcell Principle and refused to invalidate state election
rules too close to the election to preserve the status quo; they also too readily
deferred to states and thereby devalued the constitutional right to vote.
That deference carried over into the post-election litigation in 2020, although it
was much more justifiable in that setting. The Trump campaign and Republican supporters filed suits in at least Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, and Pennsylvania,
as well as directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, and all of those suits failed.15 One might
say that the courts “deferred” to the states’ election apparatus in that judges refused
to invalidate the results of a just-completed election. At times, the courts in the postelection litigation relied on a doctrine of laches (that plaintiffs brought the lawsuits
too late) or lack of standing.16 But courts also rejected the claims on the merits,
noting that undoing an election after the fact would disenfranchise millions of voters
or that the specific allegations were not enough to change the result.17 Either way,
the post-election cases say less about the future of election law doctrine—except that
courts are extremely reluctant to entertain claims to overturn an election—than do
the pre-election cases on the administration of an upcoming election. Those preelection cases exhibit an undue deference standard that refuses to question state
processes even in the face of strong evidence of likely disenfranchisement.
This Article shows why the federal courts’ jurisprudence toward the right to
vote in these recent cases is so concerning. Part I recounts the 2020 pre–Election
Day litigation to demonstrate how the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal appeals
courts too readily deferred to states and election officials without requiring states to
identify the “precise interests”18 that their laws promote or why it was “necessary”
to burden voters’ rights.19 It also explains how several Supreme Court justices and
14

See Michael T. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections,
and State Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2020).
15
See Jacob Shamsian & Sonam Sheth, Trump and His Allies Filed More than 40 Lawsuits Challenging the 2020 Election Results. All of Them Failed, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 22,
2021, 5:03 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-campaign-lawsuits-election-results
-2020-11 [https://perma.cc/2HSE-3D6E].
16
See, e.g., King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 731–32 (E.D. Mich. 2020); Wood v.
Raffensberger, 981 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2020).
17
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump for President v. Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., 830 Fed. App’x
377, 382 (3d Cir. 2020) (“The Campaign’s claims have no merit. The number of ballots it specifically challenges is far smaller than the roughly 81,000-vote margin of victory. And it never
claims fraud or that any votes were cast by illegal voters.”).
18
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
19
This Article focuses on federal court litigation that was appealed to the federal appellate courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. There was also significant 2020 election litigation
in the state courts.
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at least one circuit court breathed new life into the independent state legislature doctrine. Part II illustrates why this jurisprudence is wrong under Anderson-Burdick and
explains how it devalues the right to vote, the most fundamental right in our democracy. Deference to state legislatures is particularly inappropriate in election cases
given legislators’ inherent incentive to craft election rules to help keep themselves
in power. Part III suggests that if the courts do not alter their jurisprudence, then the
only solution may be robust federal legislation or a constitutional amendment that
enshrines the right to vote in the U.S. Constitution and requires states to justify, with
specificity, any infringements on that right.
I. THE 2020 PRE–ELECTION DAY LITIGATION
SURROUNDING THE VOTING PROCESS
If the right to vote is a precious, fundamental right, then we would expect federal
courts to require states to justify the burdens they impose on that right. To be sure, the
U.S. Constitution does not explicitly confer the right to vote, leading the Supreme
Court to invoke the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
primary source of voting rights protection.20 Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court has adopted the Anderson-Burdick balancing test for non-severe burdens on
the right to vote, whereby the courts balance the burdens a law imposes with the
state’s reasons for administering the election in that way.21 Yet those cases still require a state to offer “precise interests” for a law and explain why the burden it imposes
is “necessary” to effectuate its goals.22 Anderson-Burdick is not simply a rational
basis test.
As the numerous 2020 federal cases show, however, courts unduly deferred to
state legislatures without any requirement that the state offer precise interests for its
law.23 In fact, there were many examples of district courts providing relief from an
onerous voting law only to have appellate courts reverse those decisions and dictate
repeatedly that courts should not second-guess states in their election administration.24 What remains is a doctrine of undue deference that devalues the right to vote.
That undue deference has come in two forms. First, in a majority of the 2020
cases about the voting process, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts simply
failed to apply the Anderson-Burdick test accurately and did not require states to
explain their “precise interests” for their laws or why they were “necessary” to burden
voters.25 It was almost as if the courts silently overturned Anderson-Burdick itself
20

See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969).
21
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432–34 (1992); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
22
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
23
See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2020).
24
See id.
25
See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
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or at least gutted its second and third prongs. Second, as the election drew closer,
several justices and at least one federal appeals court invoked the “independent state
legislature” doctrine to say that only the state legislature—and not state courts or
even state election officials—can dictate election rules.26 Both methods of deference are
concerning for the judicial protection of the right to vote.27
A. Undermining Anderson-Burdick’s Requirement that States Justify Their
Election Rules
Shades of undue deference to states in election litigation became apparent in
April 2020, when the Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s decision that had
extended the absentee ballot receipt deadline for the Wisconsin primary due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.28 Although the Court rested its decision on the Purcell
Principle, which says that courts should not change the rules too close to an election
to avoid confusion, the Court also said that “[e]xtending the date by which ballots may
be cast by voters—not just received by the municipal clerks but cast by voters—for
an additional six days after the scheduled election day fundamentally alters the
nature of the election.”29 Implicit in that statement is deference to the Wisconsin legislature to decide the “nature of the election” without court interference, no matter
the burden on voters that the pandemic might create.
Justice Kavanaugh was even more explicit in invoking judicial deference to state
legislatures in a different case reversing a lower court ruling that had invalidated
South Carolina’s witness requirement for absentee ballots, thereby reinstating the
state’s rule that absentee ballots need a witness signature.30 He wrote, in a concurrence
to the short order, that “a State legislature’s decision either to keep or to make
26

See Morley, supra note 14, at 9; Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 732 (2001).
27
In addition to these cases involving the voting process, there were numerous cases in
2020 about ballot access, either for candidates or initiatives. These cases tended to challenge
states’ signature requirements as too onerous due to the pandemic. Plaintiffs were largely unsuccessful in these cases as well, with deference to state laws playing a role in the analysis.
For example, the Third Circuit, affirming a district court decision that rejected a challenge to
Pennsylvania’s signature requirement for candidates to appear on the ballot, credited the state’s
“legitimate and sufficiently important interests in ‘avoiding ballot clustering, ensuring viable
candidates, and the orderly and efficient administration of elections.’” Libertarian Party of Pa.
v. Gov. of Pa., 813 Fed. App’x 834,835 (3d Cir. 2020). However, plaintiffs did find relief in
Illinois. See Libertarian Party of Ill. v. Cadigan, 824 Fed. App’x 415, 415–16 (7th Cir. 2020).
Otherwise, courts rejected claims to change the ballot access rules due to the pandemic. See
Table of 2020 Election Cases in Federal Appeals Courts, https://drive.google.com/file/d/15x
C1qbr_IZH7p363hKHrjAZBW2Uuu4hG/view [https://perma.cc/ZVF7-8HXX] (last visited
Oct. 27, 2021).
28
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1208 (2020).
29
Id. at 1207.
30
See Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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changes to election rules to address COVID-19 ordinarily ‘should not be subject to
second-guessing by an “unelected federal judiciary,” which lacks the background,
competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the
people.’”31 Deference to the legislature was more important than protecting the
fundamental right to vote during a major health crisis.
Perhaps most concerningly, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh both explicitly
espoused an undue deference standard in a case involving Wisconsin’s absentee ballot receipt deadline for the general election, refusing to enjoin a Seventh Circuit
decision that had put on hold a district court order extending the deadline by six
days.32 Each justice wrote a concurrence to the ruling to explain why courts should
not intervene to invalidate election rules.33 Both concurrences argued for a strong
election law theory of undue deference.34 Neither opinion grappled with the burdens
Wisconsin’s election regime imposed on voters or invoked any concept of a constitutional right to vote.35 Justice Gorsuch wrote that “[t]he Constitution provides that
state legislatures—not federal judges, not state judges, not state governors, not other
state officials—bear primary responsibility for setting election rules.”36 Justice
Kavanaugh declared that “[t]his Court has consistently stated that the Constitution
principally entrusts politically accountable state legislatures, not unelected federal
judges, with the responsibility to address the health and safety of the people during
the COVID-19 pandemic.”37 Justice Kavanaugh even cited explicitly a “principle of
deference to state legislatures” for these election cases.38 He also rejected the “ordinary Anderson-Burdick balancing test for analyzing state election rules.”39 Although
other justices did not sign on to these two concurrences, the case suggests that
Anderson-Burdick itself may be on life support, replaced by a standard that simply
defers to state legislatures in their election administration.40
1. Invoking Undue Deference to Uphold Restrictive Voting Rules
Numerous circuit courts of appeals—filled with Trump appointees—reversed
lower court rulings that would have expanded voter access in 2020, relying on the
31

Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting South Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 590 U.S. ____ (2020) (application for injunctive relief) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)).
32
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. St. Leg., 141 S. Ct. 28, 29 (2020).
33
Id. at 29–30 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
34
Id.
35
See id. at 28–30, 35.
36
Id. at 29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
37
Id. at 32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
38
Id. at 33.
39
Id. at 35.
40
Id. In addition to these cases, which had written opinions, in October 2020 the Court
stayed a lower court’s decision that had put on hold Alabama’s ban on curbside voting, even
though several Alabama counties sought to offer it. Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct.
25 (2020).
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supposed deference due to state legislatures and election officials in administering
an election.41 Voting rights plaintiffs were largely unsuccessful in these lawsuits,
winning ultimate relief in only a few cases.42 Three of those wins involved states
that had actually agreed to the voting changes (in Montana, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island) and a fourth was not about the voting process but whether to run the
congressional election at all (in Minnesota) after a candidate had died.43
In the aggregate, these cases show a clear ideological pattern for the adoption
of a narrow construction of the constitutional right to vote.44 There were at least
eighteen cases in 2020 where a district court ruled in favor of voting rights plaintiffs
and invalidated a state law, often due to the difficulties voters faced during a pandemic, only to see the circuit courts of appeals reverse those decisions.45 Eight of
those cases were 3–0 decisions, nine were 2–1, and one en banc case was 6–4; those
split decisions typically fell along ideological lines based on the president who
appointed each judge.46 Perhaps most tellingly, twelve of the eighteen cases, and
seven of the nine 2–1 decisions, included at least one Trump-appointed judge in the
majority.47 The 6–4 en banc decision from the Eleventh Circuit on Florida’s felon
disenfranchisement law included five Trump-appointed judges in the majority.48
Forty-three percent of the judges that were in the majority in these cases (21 of 48)
were Trump appointees.49 Most of the circuit court opinions rested on the need to
defer to state legislatures or state election officials.50 Suffice to say, voting rights
41

See Charlie Savage, G.O.P.-Appointed Judges Threaten Democracy, Liberals Seeking
Court Expansion Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/us
/politics/court-packing-judges.html [https://perma.cc/6GC7-BG7T].
42
See Table of 2020 Election Cases in Federal Appeals Courts, supra note 27. The spreadsheet lists the U.S. Supreme Court appeal from the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, but I have omitted that case from this statistic given that it did not go through a federal
appeals court.
43
See id. A fifth case that voting rights plaintiffs won was on a Tennessee law that required first-time voters who registered online or by mail to vote in person. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s order enjoining the law. Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v.
Hargett, 978 F.3d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 2020). A sixth case was a challenge to New York cancelling its presidential primary given that Joe Biden was the presumptive Democratic nominee,
other candidates had dropped out, and the state was concerned about a large gathering during
the pandemic; the court reinstated the primary. Yang v. Kosinski, 805 Fed. App’x 63, 64–65
(2d Cir. 2020).
44
See Joshua A. Douglas, How Trump-Appointed Judges Have Made It Harder to Vote,
CNN (Nov. 1, 2020 10:48 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/01/opinions/trump-judges
-harder-to-vote-douglas/index.html [https://perma.cc/NRW3-C36T].
45
See Table of 2020 Election Cases in Federal Appeals Courts, supra note 27.
46
See id.
47
See id.
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
See id.
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advocates did not do well in the federal appeals courts in 2020. Instead, courts
essentially trusted states to regulate the election as they wished.
The language of the opinions bears this out. The Fifth Circuit expressly deferred
to the state in reversing a district court order that had rejected Texas Governor Greg
Abbott’s directive to allow only one ballot drop off location per county.51 The appellate court found that there was “no more than a de minimis burden on the right
to vote”—despite the harms to voters, especially in large counties, who preferred
dropping off their absentee ballot in person.52 On the state interest inquiry, the court
ruled that the district court had “undervalued” the goals of an “orderly administration
of elections” and “vigilantly reducing opportunities for voting fraud.”53 But besides
speculating that “‘mail-in voting’ is ‘far more vulnerable to fraud’ than other ‘forms
of voting,”54 the court did not explain how the state’s ballot drop off limitation
specifically achieved these goals. Thus, the crux of the decision was the court’s
deference to the state’s determination.55
Another panel of the Fifth Circuit rejected a district court order that would have
required Texas to allow voters to cure a signature mismatch, instead permitting the
state to simply reject those ballots.56 The court said that the law would not impose
a severe burden on voters and credited the state’s justification of preventing voter
fraud. “[W]e do not force states to shoulder ‘the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective effects’ of election laws.”57
The Fifth Circuit also rejected a district court judgment that put on hold a new
Texas law that eliminated straight ticket voting, resting its decision both on the
Purcell Principle and on the notion that the status quo was the new Texas law
eliminating the straight ticket option, even though the state was implementing it for
the first time in November 2020.58 The court’s determination that a new law, not yet
in force, constituted the “status quo” demonstrated the court’s deference to legislative judgment on the matter.59
Further, the Fifth Circuit stayed a lower court order that would have imposed
a mask mandate for poll workers and voters.60 The district court had found that the
state’s rule that exempted polling sites from the state’s mask mandate would likely
violate the Voting Rights Act, as it would make minority voters—who were suffering
51

Tex. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136, 140 (5th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 145.
53
Id. at 146.
54
Id. (citations omitted).
55
Notably, even though the decision came less than a month before the end of the voting
period, the court expressly chose not to consider the timing issues pursuant to Purcell. See
id. at 142.
56
See Richardson v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2020).
57
Id. at 240 (citation omitted).
58
Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Hughs, 976 F.3d 564, 565 (5th Cir. 2020).
59
Id. at 568.
60
Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 834 F. App’x 860, 861 (5th Cir. 2020).
52
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disproportionate harms from the virus—less comfortable voting; the Fifth Circuit,
relying mostly on the Purcell Principle, deferred to the state.61
The Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court decision that would have required Ohio
Secretary of State Frank LaRose to allow counties to offer multiple ballot drop box
locations.62 LaRose wanted drop boxes available only at the county clerk’s offices,
meaning each county would have only one place for voters to deliver their ballots
in person.63 In reversing the lower court’s order to require additional drop box spots, the
court cited a “state’s interest in the ‘orderly administration of elections[,]’” but failed
to explain precisely how limiting the number of drop box locations would promote
that goal, beyond noting that election officials have a lot of tasks in the lead-up to
the election.64 Perhaps most tellingly, the court opined that its decision “is unlikely
to harm anyone.”65 That finding failed to credit the plaintiffs’ assertions—which the
district court found persuasive based on the evidence presented—that a single drop
box location would make it harder for many voters to deliver their ballots in person
and thus to participate at all if they wanted to vote via absentee ballot but did not
trust the mail because of the politicization of the postal service.66
The Sixth Circuit also refused to invalidate Tennessee’s absentee balloting rules,
invoking the doctrine of standing to shield itself from determining the constitutionality of the state’s election practices during a pandemic.67 But Judge Moore, in dissent,
saw through this procedural mechanism to note the harm the court’s ruling would
have on voting rights:
Make no mistake: today’s majority opinion is yet another chapter
in the concentrated effort to restrict the vote. To be sure, it does
not cast itself as such—invoking instead the disinterested language of justiciability—but this only makes today’s majority opinion more troubling. As a result of today’s decision, Tennessee is
free to—and will—disenfranchise hundreds, if not thousands of its
citizens who cast their votes absentee by mail. Masking today’s
outcome in standing doctrine obscures that result, but that makes
it all the more disquieting. I will not be a party to this passive
sanctioning of disenfranchisement.68
61

Id. at 863.
A. Philip Randolph Inst. of Ohio v. LaRose, 831 Fed. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2020).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 192.
65
Id.
66
See Leila Fadel, The Politicization of the Postal Service, NPR (Aug. 15, 2020, 5:40
PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/15/902894304/the-politicization-of-the-postal-service
[https://perma.cc/2LYL-QLP9].
67
See Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 978 F.3d 378, 393–94 (6th Cir. 2020).
68
Id. at 392 (Moore, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
62
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The same panel, however, refused to reverse a district court order that had put
on hold a Tennessee law that required voters who registered online or by mail to
vote in person the first time they vote.69 The major issue was that the state had waited
too long to appeal and that voting had already started.70 Thus, the court said that
even if the state had a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal, the
other equities favored the plaintiffs in this setting.71 This decision was one of the
only significant circuit court opinions in 2020 favoring voting rights plaintiffs that
did not face reversal from the Supreme Court.72
Finally, in a case from Michigan, the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court order
that had put on hold the state’s ban on paying someone to provide transportation to
the polls.73 The court credited the state’s interest in preventing fraud through “vote
hauling”—despite a lack of evidence that this problem actually affects Michigan
elections.74 As the dissent noted,
[w]ithout any evidence of an anti-fraud purpose, we would need
to conclude that voter transportation fundamentally promotes voter
fraud . . . . The majority’s invocation of vote-hauling is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs want to rent buses to help people get to the
polls; companies like Uber want to provide discounted rides to
the polls in Michigan as they have in every other state. These
prohibited activities are a far cry from the majority’s specter of
vote-hauling.75
The Seventh Circuit, in early October 2020, reversed a district court decision
that had extended various deadlines for registration and absentee ballot delivery in
Wisconsin.76 In particular, the lower court ruling had extended the received-by date
from Election Day to six days later so long as the ballots were postmarked by Election
Day.77 In addition to rejecting the lower court’s order under the Purcell Principle,
the court explained that “[d]eciding how best to cope with difficulties caused by
69

See Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 977 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 569.
71
Id.
72
The state did not appeal this ruling to the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs also secured relief
in cases from Montana, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, even at the circuit court, but the state
had consented to the election changes in those cases. Thus, the circuit courts still deferred
to the states and rejected challenges from other parties. See Lamm v. Bullock, No. 20-35847,
2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 31714 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2020); Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir.
2020); Common Cause R.I. v. Gorbea, 970 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2020).
73
Priorities USA v. Nessel, 978 F.3d 976 (6th Cir. 2020).
74
Id. at 983.
75
Id. at 990 (Cole, C.J., dissenting).
76
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2020).
77
Id.
70
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disease is principally a task for the elected branches of government.”78 There was
little discussion of the infringement on the constitutional right to vote or the need for
the state to offer its “precise interests,” under Anderson-Burdick, for maintaining its
current absentee balloting rules, especially during the pandemic.79 As noted above,
the Supreme Court, on a 5–3 vote, refused to issue a stay of that decision.80
In another case from the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed a district court’s decision rejecting the plaintiff’s challenge to Indiana’s absentee balloting rules, the
court again deferred to the legislature.81 Indiana was one of only five states in 2020
that still required a non-COVID-19 excuse to vote absentee.82 But older voters did
not need an additional excuse.83 The plaintiffs argued that the Indiana law violates
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment because it allows voters aged 65 and older, but not
younger voters, to request an absentee ballot without any other excuse.84 The court
rejected the claim because, it asserted, what was at stake was not the right to vote but
instead the “privilege” to vote in a particular manner.85 Inherent in that very framing
is the notion that the legislature can decide the methods available for certain people
to vote without judicial interference. “[B]alancing the interests of discouraging fraud
and mitigating elections-related issues with encouraging voter turnout is a judgment
reserved to the legislature,” the court said.86 The court further claimed that the state
itself was not burdening the right to vote through its refusal to respond to the difficulties some people faced when voting in person during the pandemic: “the statute does
not ‘impact [Plaintiffs’] ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote’ or ‘absolutely prohibit [Plaintiffs] from voting’; only the pandemic is potentially guilty of
those charges.”87 Never mind that the state’s refusal to accommodate voters was
actually the inaction that impacted the ability to vote for many people.
The Seventh Circuit then relied on these two cases to reverse a district court’s
ruling that had extended the absentee ballot receipt deadline in Indiana, reverting to
the prior state rule that election officials must receive all absentee ballots by noon
on Election Day.88 “[D]ifficulties adributable [sic] to the virus do not require change
78
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in electoral rules—not, at least, as a constitutional matter. That some people are
unwilling to vote in person does not make an otherwise-valid system unconstitutional. It is for states to decide what sort of adjustments would be prudent.”89
The Seventh Circuit also reversed a lower court order that had invalidated a new
Indiana law on who can sue to seek an extension of the polling hours on Election Day
if there are problems.90 The district court had found that the new law, which allows
only county election boards to bring suit and imposes various evidentiary standards,
violated the constitutional right to vote because it would preclude voters from
seeking a remedy to a polling place issue.91 The Seventh Circuit reversed, saying
that “Anderson-Burdick does not license such narrow second-guessing of legislative
decision making.”92
The Eighth Circuit stayed a lower court decision that had invalidated Missouri’s
rule separating “absentee” voters from “mail-in” voters.93 Absentee voters, who had
to provide an excuse to vote absentee, could return their ballots either in person or
via the mail. But “mail-in” voters, who were people voting by mail because of the
risks of COVID-19, could return their ballots only through the mail.94 The district
court found that this differential scheme for delivering ballots violated the right to
vote, but the Eighth Circuit reversed.95 The court relied on some of the cases from
the other circuits—in particular the restrictive rulings from the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits—and said that “[t]he Missouri Legislature is entrusted with the responsibility and authority to weigh relevant considerations and proposals and craft legislation.”96 The court therefore deferred to the state’s new rule that forbade mail-in
voters from delivering their ballots in person yet still required these ballots to arrive
by 7:00 pm on Election Day, calling the rule a “reasonable and rational exercise of
the State’s authority.”97 Judge Kelly, in dissent, more appropriately noted that although the state asserted an interest in “preserving the integrity of its election
process,” “interests such as these cannot merely be asserted in the abstract.”98
The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting a district court’s order that would have required
Arizona to allow early voters to “cure” a signature problem up to five days after
Election Day, at least discussed the state’s regulatory interests but couched them as
necessitating only a “reasonable” justification.99
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All ballots must have some deadline, and it is reasonable that
Arizona has chosen to make that deadline Election Day itself so
as to promote its unquestioned interest in administering an orderly
election and to facilitate its already burdensome job of collecting,
verifying, and counting all of the votes in timely fashion.100
In another case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s ruling that had
extended the Arizona voter registration deadline due to the pandemic by crediting
the “administrative burdens” the Arizona Secretary of State would face with a later
deadline.101
The Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court ruling from Georgia that had
extended the absentee ballot receipt deadline to three days after Election Day.102 The
court found that the lower court had “improperly weigh[ed] the State’s interests.”103
The court echoed other courts in saying that the absentee balloting rules “do[] not
implicate the right to vote at all,”104 failing to recognize that restrictions on returning
an absentee ballot during a pandemic surely make it harder for some people to vote
and therefore do impact the constitutional right to vote. On the state interest front,
the court credited the state’s generalized assertions: “These include conducting an
efficient election, maintaining order, quickly certifying election results, and preventing voter fraud.”105 There was no discussion of how Georgia’s rules, applied during
a pandemic, would further those generalized state interests. A simple assertion of the
need to run an “efficient election” and “maintain[] order” was enough.106
The Eleventh Circuit, without explanation, also stayed a district court order from
Alabama that would have eased the state’s witness requirement and photo ID law
for absentee voters who had higher risk of COVID-19, though the court refused to
reinstate Alabama’s ban on curbside voting.107 But the Supreme Court then issued
a stay, by a 5–3 vote, on the curbside voting portion of the lawsuit, reinstating the
Alabama Secretary of State’s ban on the practice, though the Court provided no
reasoning for its ruling.108
Some district courts have taken notice of this widespread circuit precedent to
defer to the states. A Georgia district court decision exemplifies the pervasiveness
100
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of the undue deference given to state election officials.109 The court found that
Georgia’s new implementation of electronic ballot marking devices would probably
violate the constitutional right to vote given their unreliability.110 But the court, in
seeming almost apologetic for its ruling, said that its hands were tied:
Ultimately, the Court must find that imposition of such a sweeping
change in the State’s primary legally adopted method for conducting elections at this moment in the electoral cycle would fly
in the face of binding appellate authority and the State’s strong
interest in ensuring an orderly and manageable administration of
the current election, consistent with state law. So, for this reason
alone, despite the strength of Plaintiffs’ evidence, the Court must
decline the Plaintiffs’ Motions for Preliminary Injunction.111
None of this discussion is meant to suggest that the courts were definitely wrong
in the outcome of each of these cases. Perhaps the plaintiffs did not present strong
enough evidence of the burdens the state laws would impose, or perhaps changing
the state’s rules at the last minute would cause too much confusion. But the analytical
framework was wrong because the courts did not require the states to demonstrate
the “precise interests” that would justify a burden on the constitutional right to vote,
as Anderson purportedly requires.112
2. Deferring to States that Eased Voting Rules
On the flip side, strong deference to state legislatures and election officials can
help the cause of expanded voting rights when courts reject plaintiffs’ attempts to
have judges impose even stricter rules on the voting process—or when they seek to
overturn the results after the election. Deference drove the Supreme Court’s rejection of a challenge to a lower court’s consent decree that suspended Rhode Island’s
normal rule that requires absentee ballots to have two witnesses or a notary.113 In
denying a stay of the lower court’s ruling, the Court noted that “here the state election
officials support the challenged decree, and no state official has expressed opposition.”114 That is, the Court rejected the appeal because the state itself had consented
to the lower court’s order that changed its election regime. The First Circuit, in the
same case that the Supreme Court upheld, noted that “in the abstract, the broader
regulatory interest—preventing voting fraud and enhancing the perceived integrity
109
110
111
112
113
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of elections—is substantial and important,” but explained that the state itself was not
challenging the relaxation of those rules during the pandemic.115 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit rejected a challenge to a North Carolina State Board of Elections
decree to extend the absentee ballot receipt deadline, noting that the “status quo”
was the State Board’s modifications to state law.116 The Supreme Court refused to
stay that decision.117
A similar phenomenon was present in a Trump campaign lawsuit in Pennsylvania
involving the state’s drop box rules.118 The Trump campaign asserted that the use of
drop boxes to collect absentee ballots was unconstitutional because of the risk of fraud,
but the district court rejected that challenge, saying that any election integrity harm
was speculative.119 In deferring to the legislature on this point, the court explained,
Plaintiffs essentially ask this Court to second-guess the judgment
of the Pennsylvania General Assembly and election officials, who
are experts in creating and implementing an election plan. Perhaps Plaintiffs are right that guards should be placed near drop
boxes, signature-analysis experts should examine every mail-in
ballot, poll watchers should be able to man any poll regardless
of location, and other security improvements should be made.
But the job of an unelected federal judge isn’t to suggest election
improvements, especially when those improvements contradict
the reasoned judgment of democratically elected officials.120
The district court engaged in a painstaking review of whether the state’s drop
box rules, such as having in-person guards in some counties but not others, violated
the Equal Protection Clause.121 The court explained that these differential rules would
not violate the right to vote or dilute any votes because the plaintiffs could only
speculate that drop boxes would lead to fraudulent votes.122 On the state interest side
of the scale, the court noted that Pennsylvania had provided “reasonable, precise,
and sufficiently weighty interests that are undisputed.”123 Instead of just general
assertions about the need to run an election, the court credited the “precise” interests
115
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that the state offered on the specific aspects of its drop box rules.124 The court agreed
with the state’s interests but in the way that Anderson-Burdick requires: by evaluating “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule.”125
Other district courts similarly rejected Trump campaign lawsuits to undo state
changes to ease the voting process in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.126 In
New Jersey, a district court dismissed a challenge to the legislature’s decision to
allow election officials to start processing mail-in ballots ten days before Election
Day and to count ballots received without a postmark up to two days after Election
Day.127 The court disagreed with the Trump campaign’s argument that the mail-in
balloting scheme violated federal law and instead deferred to the judgment of the
New Jersey legislature.128 Similarly, a district judge in Montana denied the Trump
campaign’s speculation that the Montana Governor’s decision to allow counties to
conduct the election by mail would open the door to fraud.129 The court found that
the Montana legislature had given the Montana Governor the authority to issue
emergency regulations during the pandemic—thereby deferring to state authorities
on how to run the election.130
In addition to the pre-election litigation, courts refused to disturb the results after
the election, showing a mode of deference to the state’s voting processes. For instance,
in rejecting a challenge to the presidential election in Wisconsin, a district judge wrote:
[O]n the merits of plaintiff’s claims, the Court now further concludes that plaintiff has not proved that defendants violated his
rights under the Electors Clause. To the contrary, the record shows
Wisconsin’s Presidential Electors are being determined in the
very manner directed by the Legislature, as required by Article II,
Section 1 of the Constitution.131
Courts therefore refused to question the way states ran their elections after-the-fact,
especially when there was little evidence of problems or when the margin of victory
124
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was large.132 As Samuel Issacharoff notes, “In both periods [pre- and post-election],
courts proved to be defenders of preexisting institutional arrangements against claimed
needs to emergency alterations.”133
These cases show that deference can help the cause of expanded voting rights
when playing defense against a challenge to a state determination to make voting
easier. But that same deference harms voting rights plaintiffs when seeking relief
against a state’s refusal to ease the burdens of voting during the pandemic. The
difference is the kind of legislative action at stake: facilitating the right to vote as
compared to burdening it—expanding a constitutional right as compared to restricting it. Imagine that the government opened up more property to speech: no judicial
scrutiny is necessary because the state’s practice would further the constitutional right
of free speech, so deference to the state’s action is warranted. But if the government
began closing off properties available for speech, courts would require the government to justify its actions with specificity and would not defer so readily.134 The
same analysis should apply for the right to vote.135
Thus, although the deference to states in administering an election is similar, the
results are analytically distinct: deferring to state authorities when they have already
eased the voting process promotes the on-the-ground determination of how to protect voters, while deferring to legislatures in a challenge to restrictive voting rules
harms the fundamental right to vote. Deference has been a shield to both kinds of
challenges—those against expansive and restrictive voting rules—without recognizing
that the two kinds of claims are quite different.136 Anderson’s requirement that states
proffer a “precise interest” to justify a burden on the right to vote demonstrates that
deference to a state that makes it easier to vote is qualitatively different from deference
to a state that makes it harder to vote.137
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B. Deference Through the Independent State Legislature Doctrine
A few of the 2020 cases saw Supreme Court Justices and one federal appeals
court invoke the independent state legislature doctrine to reject election rules that
were intended to ease the voting process during the pandemic, as the state legislature
had not directly passed those rules.138
These cases drew on the recent history of the independent state legislature
doctrine.139 In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, which was the first
case the U.S. Supreme Court heard stemming from the Florida 2000 presidential
election dispute, the Court stated that although normally it will defer to a state court’s
interpretation of a state statute, in the context of a presidential election, “the legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the State, but
by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under” the U.S. Constitution.140 Specifically, Article I, Section 2 says that “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.”141 The Court remanded for
the Florida Supreme Court to explain “the extent to which [it] saw the Florida
Constitution as circumscribing the legislature’s authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.”142
When the case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, the majority
opinion did not address this question, resting its decision on the Equal Protection
Clause and the federal safe harbor statute.143 But Chief Justice Rehnquist, for himself
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote a concurrence to expound upon the independent state legislature doctrine.144 He posited that the Court should defer to the state
legislature and overturn the state supreme court’s ruling because “[a] significant
departure from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents
a federal constitutional question.”145 That “legislative scheme” might include the
delegation of authority to the Secretary of State and the state circuit courts.146 Importantly, then, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not suggest that state legislatures have
no constraints whatsoever when regulating presidential elections, but only that a state
supreme court’s decision cannot “wholly change” the legislature’s commands.147 Thus,
the Rehnquist concurrence concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law was an “impermissibl[e] distort[ion]. . . beyond what a fair reading
138
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required.”148 This is a bold claim: these Justices essentially said that they were in a better position than the Florida Supreme Court to determine the meaning of Florida law.
A majority of Justices rejected the independent state legislature doctrine in a
2015 case involving Arizona’s independent redistricting commission.149 Arizona
voters passed a state constitutional amendment in 2000 to remove the power to draw
district lines from the legislature and give it to an independent commission.150 The
Republican-controlled Arizona legislature sued after the commission adopted new
congressional maps in 2012, arguing that the commission itself was invalid under
the U.S. Constitution.151 Specifically, the Arizona legislature argued that Article I,
Section 4, the Elections Clause, vests authority only in the “legislature” to direct the
“manner” of regulating congressional elections.152 The Court, in a 5–4 vote, rejected
the claim, holding that the term “legislature” in the Elections Clause encompasses the
state’s “lawmaking” powers, which includes the initiative process under the Arizona
Constitution.153 The Court noted that “[n]othing in that Clause instructs, nor has this
Court ever held, that a state legislature may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and
manner of holding federal elections in defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.”154 That would seem to end the matter and should apply to the term “legislature”
in Article II, Section 1 for the manner of appointing presidential electors as well.
But even though a majority rejected the doctrine in 2015, several Justices
reinvigorated the idea in 2020 by suggesting that state courts have no role to interpret state laws that regulate the presidential election, even if the state courts are
construing those laws to be consistent with the state constitution.155 Just days before
Election Day 2020, at least four Justices indicated that they believe the U.S. Supreme Court should review decisions from state supreme courts to ensure deference
to state legislatures.156 In an appeal from a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
that extended the absentee ballot receipt deadline pursuant to the state constitution,
Justice Alito—joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch—suggested that state legislatures have plenary power to determine the rules for federal elections.157 Given that
the U.S. Constitution gives authority to the state “legislature” to regulate elections,
these justices questioned the state supreme court’s interpretation of the state’s rules
under the state constitution.158 Justice Kavanaugh made a similar pronouncement in
148
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dicta in a case from Wisconsin, echoing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in
Bush v. Gore.159 And Justice Gorsuch reiterated his view in a case out of North
Carolina, saying that the State Board of Elections could not alter the absentee ballot
receipt deadline because only the legislature has that power.160 This view seems to go
even further than Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence: Justice Gorsuch suggested
that the North Carolina State Board of Elections has no authority whatsoever to
“(re)writ[e] election laws” given the Constitution’s command that “only the state
‘Legislature’” may determine the manner of appointing electors.161 Interestingly,
even though Chief Justice Roberts wrote a vigorous dissent in the Arizona Independent Redistricting case in 2015, he did not join these opinions in 2020.162 Moreover,
Justice Barrett, brand new to the Court, did not participate in these cases. Thus, it
is not clear whether a majority of Justices are willing to question any election rules
that a state legislature does not promulgate. But the issue is surely to recur, and it is
possible that there are enough votes to solidify the independent state legislature
doctrine, placing few constraints on legislatures and allowing them to burden the
right to vote more easily.
At least one federal appellate court also agreed with the doctrine in the lead up
to the 2020 election. The Eighth Circuit invoked it to reverse a district court in a
challenge to the Minnesota Secretary of State’s extension of the absentee ballot deadline, issuing its decision only five days before Election Day.163 The court ruled that
only the legislature—and not the state’s chief election official—can alter election
rules.164 Plaintiffs in Texas then invoked this theory in a stunning lawsuit to throw
out votes, filed only three days before Election Day, by arguing that Harris County,
Texas was not permitted to allow drive-in voting, even though the Texas Supreme
Court had rejected a prior challenge and over 100,000 voters had already cast their
ballots in this manner.165 The district court dismissed the lawsuit based on the
if a state court could override the rules adopted by the legislature simply by claiming that a state
constitutional provision gave the courts the authority to make whatever rules it thought
appropriate for the conduct of a fair election.”).
159
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plaintiff’s lack of standing but also indicated that, if it had reached the merits, it
would have rejected the claim for the votes already cast during early voting, but that
it would have disallowed drive-in voting on Election Day itself because of a lack of
“legislative authorization for movable structures.”166
In sum, although voting rights plaintiffs enjoyed some initial success in federal
court when challenging election laws that burdened the right to vote, especially during
a pandemic, the Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeals mostly reversed
those decisions.167 The Purcell Principle—the admonition against changing election
rules too close to an election—did some of the work,168 but the other driver was a
pernicious doctrine that defers too readily to states in their election administration.
The cases reveal that undue deference to state legislatures has come from two
sources. First, in cases involving the U.S. Constitution’s protection of the right to vote,
the Court has deferred by not requiring states to provide a precise interest for their
voting laws under the Anderson-Burdick test.169 Second, in cases from state courts
involving the state constitution’s protection of the right to vote, the U.S. Supreme
Court has suggested that it must defer to state legislatures under Article I, Section
4 and Article II, Section 1, which confer authority to the “legislature” to regulate
elections.170 The upshot of this jurisprudence: no matter the source of constitutional
protection for the right to vote, courts must simply defer to the state legislature in its
election laws. Most concerningly, the implications of this approach greatly impacted
the administration of the 2020 election and will likely affect the future of election
law doctrine for years to come.
II. THE DEVALUATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE
BECAUSE OF UNDUE DEFERENCE TO STATES
The undue deference to state legislatures in the 2020 litigation was both wrong
and dangerous. It was wrong because it was not faithful to the Supreme Court’s
initial explication of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test to evaluate burdens on the
right to vote. It was dangerous because it devalued the importance and significance
of the right to vote and failed to account for the difficulties voters faced during a
pandemic. If the Supreme Court and lower federal courts insist on continuing down
this path of undue deference to state legislatures in election cases, then the only
recourse may be a constitutional amendment that makes explicit what should already
166
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be part of our constitutional structure: the paramount importance of the fundamental
right to vote.171
First, current doctrine is not in line with the Supreme Court’s previous rules for
the right to vote. To be sure, the Supreme Court has stated that strict scrutiny is not
required to evaluate all election laws: “to subject every voting regulation to strict
scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections
are operated equitably and efficiently.”172 But that general rule also does not mean
that courts should blindly defer to a state’s regulation of the election. Instead, the
Court applies a balancing test that weighs the burden of the law against the state’s
precise need to regulate the voting process in that specific manner:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must
weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by
its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.173
Current jurisprudence, however, has forgotten those crucial second and third
steps: discerning the state’s “precise interests” and evaluating whether those interests make it “necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”174 As Judge Kelly put it in
dissent in an Eighth Circuit case, “the state interest must be linked in some meaningful way to the particular rule or regulation that allegedly imposes a burden on a
citizen’s right to vote.”175 Crediting a state’s generalized assertion of the need to promote an orderly election or to ensure election integrity does not scrutinize the state’s
goals sufficiently enough, even under a standard that is lower than strict scrutiny.176
As I have explained previously, as recently as 2000 the Supreme Court had required
more of states than generalities about the importance of its election administration.177
Yet there has been a creep in the Court’s doctrine since then, such as in Crawford
v. Marion County Election Board in 2008, where the Court deferred to Indiana’s
171
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assertions of its need for a photo ID law based on generalized notions of “election
modernization,” rooting out “voter fraud,” and “safeguarding voter confidence.”178
The 2020 cases increase this trend, with the Supreme Court and federal courts of
appeals refusing to require states to offer “precise interests” for their election rules or
to demonstrate why those interests make the challenged regulations “necessary.”179
The problem is even more troubling given the unique concerns of voting during a
pandemic: states should be required to justify the application of their rules when it
is even more difficult for some people to vote.
Second, undue deference to legislatures devalues the fundamental right to vote.180
Courts credit state assertions of “election administration” or “election integrity,”
without more, making it harder for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights. The images
from Wisconsin after the Supreme Court’s decision in April 2020, just before the
state’s primary, told it all: extremely long lines of voters in masks who did not
receive their absentee ballots on time, with The New York Times headline explaining,
“Voters Forced to Choose Between Their Health and Their Civic Duty.”181 In a case
several months later, Judge Rovner of the Seventh Circuit recounted why undue
deference to state legislatures is inappropriate by pointing out that legislatures may
not act and voters will suffer as a result:
I recognize that the district court’s decision to order modifications
to Wisconsin’s election practices represents an intrusion into the
domain of state government, but in my view it is a necessary one.
We are seven months-plus into this pandemic. The Legislature
has had ample time to make modifications of its own to the
election code and has declined to do so.182
Judge Rovner concluded her dissent with a chilling statement: “Good luck and G-d
bless, Wisconsin. You are going to need it.”183
It is particularly concerning when an appellate court reverses a lower court’s
ruling that had invalidated an election law without considering adequately the
178
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district court’s evaluation of the evidence. The district judge is in the best position
to determine whether the application of a particular rule, especially during a pandemic, will—as a factual matter—burden the fundamental right to vote.184 District
courts hear the evidence and experts, and therefore can best evaluate the burdens on
voters on the ground. But in deferring to legislative judgments, the appellate courts
are discrediting these ground-level determinations.185 It may be that some of these
decisions were correct—that the states did have valid justifications for imposing
these rules. But courts should require states to make their case.
There are real consequences of a jurisprudence that fails to put states to the test
to justify election rules that burden voters. Fewer people may be able to participate
in our democracy. Or they will have to jump through unnecessary hoops to effectuate that most precious right. Moreover, it makes little sense to defer to state legislators regarding election laws given that these politicians have every incentive to craft
rules that will help them win re-election.186 Courts must carefully scrutinize voting
rules precisely because of the possibility that legislative majorities may try to
entrench themselves through election laws.187 As Justice Kagan put it in dissent in
the Wisconsin absentee ballot deadline case, “if there is one area where deference to
legislators should not shade into acquiescence, it is election law. For in that field
politicians’ incentives often conflict with voters’ interests—that is, whenever suppressing votes benefits the lawmakers who make the rules.”188 That entrenchment concern
provides greater reason for courts to require states to demonstrate precise justifications for any burden on the right to vote. It is no answer to say that the democratic
process can respond to these infringements; restricting the right to vote by its very
nature makes it harder to vote out the current majorities.
Moreover, this undue deference doctrine is concerning because it applies even
outside of the Purcell Principle and last-minute election lawsuits.189 Purcell is
troubling because courts are applying it incorrectly, making it harder for voting
rights plaintiffs to secure judicial protection of the constitutional right to vote as an
184

See Hon. Shira A. Schendlin, Judicial Fact-Finding and the Trial Court Judge, 69 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 367, 371–72 (2015).
185
See, e.g., A. Philip Randolph Inst. of Ohio v. LaRose, 831 Fed. App’x 188, 194 (6th Cir.
2020) (White, J., dissenting) (“I would not find that the district court, after conducting evidentiary hearings with multiple witnesses, and analyzing significant briefing, abused its discretion in enjoining what it determined to likely be an unconstitutional directive issued by a single
elected official, impacting the voting rights of thousands of citizens.”).
186
See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. St. Leg., 141 S. Ct. 28, 43 (2020) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that deference to legislative judgments makes little sense when state rules
“infringe the constitutionally enshrined right to vote”).
187
See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
188
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 43 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
189
Id. at 41–43 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing deference as a separate issue after dismissing the Purcell Principle as insufficient).

2021] UNDUE DEFERENCE TO STATES IN THE 2020 ELECTION LITIGATION

83

election nears.190 But undue deference was an additional—and often primary—
reason many courts rejected these challenges, separate from the timing of the suits
close to an election.191 These cases have therefore created circuit precedent that will
erect barriers for plaintiffs to effectuate the fundamental right to vote beyond the
2020 election. Indeed, some of the later cases in the 2020 cycle explicitly relied on
earlier cases from other circuits to justify their restrictive rulings.192
Finally, undue deference under the independent state legislature doctrine also
makes little sense, in part because it removes the vital and more robust protection
that state constitutions give to the right to vote.193 Michael Morley argues, however,
that because both Article I, Section 4 and Article II, Section 1 confer authority to
regulate federal elections only to the state “legislature,” “state constitutions cannot
restrict the scope of that authority.”194 Richard Pildes, by contrast, more convincingly
explains that “as a matter of historical practice, state legislatures were not understood at the time to be more ‘independent’ by virtue of Article II of the constraints
and conditions on their power than they were when acting pursuant to any other
source of authority.”195 That is, the term “legislature” in the U.S. Constitution does
not make the state legislature a pure free agent but entails the normal limits on its
lawmaking authority, such as through the state constitution. Vikram Amar, considering the word “legislature” in Article V, notes that “the term, used against the historical backdrop of state constitutions in 1787, was not designed to interfere with the
preexisting control that people enjoyed over their state legislatures.”196 After all,
state constitutions create state legislatures, so one would think that state legislatures
cannot act outside of the state constitution’s mandates.
190
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But perhaps the best rejection of the independent state legislature doctrine relates to the consequences of its logical extension: it would call into question tons of
election rules—especially if the doctrine means that legislatures cannot delegate
their authority to another actor, as at least Justice Gorsuch seemed to indicate.197 The
doctrine would cause courts to strike down “all state laws or constitutional provisions regulating federal elections that were passed by initiative or by a state constitutional convention.”198 It would mean that, if the legislature cannot even delegate its
authority to promulgate election rules, then Governors, Secretaries of State, Boards
of Elections, and courts would seemingly not be able to protect voters when an
emergency arises, such as during a pandemic.199 For example, Kentucky law allowed
the Governor and Secretary of State to alter the “manner” of elections during a state
of emergency;200 were the emergency regulations that the Governor and Secretary
of State crafted for the 2020 election constitutionally suspect? Could a court order
the extension of polling hours if there is a major problem on Election Day or would
only the legislature be allowed to do so? Would the doctrine invalidate pro-democracy voter initiatives, often passed because of the legislature’s inaction? After all,
voters cannot simply rely on the political process to vindicate their rights if legislative majorities refuse to act, especially because those very voting rules often serve
to help keep the majorities in power. And are state courts now unable to protect the
state constitutional right to vote, which goes beyond federal constitutional protection?201 To ask these questions is to understand how undue deference through the
independent state legislature doctrine harms voters. The doctrine undermines the
constitutional right to vote because it suggests that state legislatures can act outside
of the state constitutions’ proscriptions.
In sum, the 2020 election cycle was tough on voting rights plaintiffs, thanks to
undue deference to states and the corresponding lower federal protection for the
right to vote, alongside unfettered deference through the independent state legislature
doctrine. Even when they won cases initially in the federal district courts to ease voting
rules, federal appeals courts often reversed those favorable decisions.202 There appears
to be a new rule in the federal courts: instead of protecting the right to vote, courts must
protect states’ ability to run their election as they see fit.203 There is a new, unwarranted, and dangerous standard: undue deference to states in election litigation.
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III. THE PATH FORWARD: SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS TO
FEDERAL COURTS’ NARROW VOTING RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
As the previous Part indicated, the Supreme Court and the federal appellate
courts have been wrong in their approach to the constitutional right to vote, unduly
deferring to states in their election administration and harming voters in the process.
Therefore, the most obvious solution is for federal courts to reassess their election law
jurisprudence. If the Anderson-Burdick framework is to remain (something that itself
is questionable given that the right to vote, as a fundamental right, should actually
enjoy strict scrutiny review204), then at a minimum the courts should enforce its dictates:
states must put forth a “precise interest” for their rules and must explain why those
precise interests “make it necessary” to burden the fundamental right to vote.205
Of course, it may be a pipe dream to expect the Roberts Court to heighten the
scrutiny for the right to vote or to require states to provide more detailed justifications for their election laws. The Court seems to be doing just the opposite, gutting
the Anderson-Burdick test of its ability to protect voters.206 Part of the problem is
that the U.S. Constitution, as the Court famously noted in Bush v. Gore, does not
explicitly confer the right to vote.207 Although we do not yet know how Justice Amy
Coney Barrett will approach election law, it is a safe assumption that she will join
her fellow conservative justices to cabin the constitutional right to vote in favor of
states’ authority to regulate elections.208 Therefore, voting rights advocates need
bolder solutions to avoid a repeat of their losses in future election cycles.
A shorter-term fix would include federal legislation that eases the burdens on
voters and adopts best practices for election administration. Democrats have indicated that they will make voting rights a top priority now that they control both
Houses of Congress and the presidency.209 H.R. 1, the omnibus election legislation
204
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that House Democrats introduced in early 2019, is a good start.210 That law would
require states to adopt automatic voter registration, expand early voting, ease felon
disenfranchisement, create independent redistricting commissions, expand public
financing of campaigns, and impose various ethics rules, among other reforms.
These practices already exist in numerous states that have high turnout.211 A federal
law could require states to adopt these pro-voter rules, though Congress should
expand H.R. 1 even further to provide stronger voting rights protection.
But simply passing legislation might not be enough given the possibility of a
conservative Supreme Court that will still likely sanction restrictive state voting rules
or strike down federal legislation aimed at protecting voting rights.212 Franita Tolson
persuasively argues that Congress has strong constitutional authority under the Elections Clause and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to regulate elections.213
Nick Stephanopoulos similarly suggests that Congress may regulate elections under
the Elections Clause, the Guarantee Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.214 But, of course, a 6–3 conservative Court could still cabin Congress’s authority to regulate the voting process by construing narrowly the U.S.
Constitution’s delegation of congressional authority over elections. The Court could
invoke the independent state legislature doctrine, for instance, to invalidate congressional rules as applied to presidential elections.215
The 2020 jurisprudence, along with the reality of a conservative Court full of
“textualist” justices, therefore provides a renewed justification for a new constitutional amendment that would recognize explicitly the fundamental right to vote as
a vital feature of our democratic structure.216 As noted above, the U.S. Constitution
does not affirmatively grant the right to vote.217 Instead, the right to vote is listed in the
negative: states cannot deny the right to vote on the basis of race (Fifteenth Amendment), sex (Nineteenth Amendment), inability to pay a poll tax (Twenty-Fourth
210
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Amendment), or age over eighteen (Twenty-Sixth Amendment).218 As Gilda Daniels
notes, the “Constitution has more amendments addressing the right to vote than any
other fundamental right” but it still “does not grant the right to vote.”219 The U.S.
Supreme Court has located protection for the right to vote within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,220 but as discussed earlier, under the Anderson-Burdick test it has construed that protection narrowly and instead defers too
readily to the states.221 A commitment of an affirmative right to vote in the text of
the U.S. Constitution would require greater judicial protection if these justices are
true to their textualist jurisprudence.
Democratic Senators Richard Durbin and Elizabeth Warren—along with a handful
of other Senators—have introduced a proposed constitutional amendment to do just
that.222 That amendment would enshrine in the U.S. Constitution “the fundamental
right to vote” and would require courts to apply strict scrutiny to any infringements
on that right.223 The text of the proposed amendment says that “Every citizen of the
United States, who is of legal voting age, shall have the fundamental right to vote
in any public election held in the jurisdiction in which the citizen resides.”224 The
amendment would also impose strict scrutiny review: states would have to show that
any “denial or abridgment is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”225
The right to vote amendment would therefore require, as a textual matter, courts to
force states to provide a specific justification for any laws that burden voters—
although perhaps the language could be even stronger on this front.226 The amendment
would also repeal the constitutional allowance for felon disenfranchisement by amending Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court relied upon
in Richardson v. Ramirez to uphold California’s felon disenfranchisement practice.227
And the amendment would give Congress further authority to enforce its provisions.228
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This proposed constitutional amendment would be a good start to undo the federal
courts’ narrow jurisprudence. But the language could go even further to require states
to offer “precise interests” for a law that harms voters and explain why it is “necessary” for the state to burden voters to effectuate those interests.229 Or the text could
more explicitly invoke the stringent strict scrutiny test from Harper and Kramer,
which the Warren Court handed down in the 1960s at the height of its rights-protective
era.230 There should be no wiggle room for a conservative Supreme Court to defer
to states. What does it mean, for example, for a law to be “in furtherance” of a compelling governmental interest? Could that language be a textual hook to further
derogate the right to vote? To clear up any ambiguity, Congress should beef up this
proposed constitutional amendment even further to indicate that courts shall not
defer to states’ election laws without a specific and precise justification for why it must
burden voters’ rights and should apply rigorous strict scrutiny review. The amendment
should also clarify that it applies to all elections, including presidential elections,
meaning that state legislatures do not have unfettered authority under the independent state legislature doctrine.
In sum, to fix the devaluation of the right to vote in the federal courts’ constitutional analysis, we may need a textual requirement that the Court apply the highest
form of judicial scrutiny and may not defer to the states so readily in their election
administration. The current conservatives on the Supreme Court, as well as many
federal appellate judges, are supposedly textualists and originalists, so arguably they
would change their jurisprudence if the constitutional text was clear. The best way
to undo the harms from the 2020 election litigation and the precedents it set may be
to adopt a new amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
CONCLUSION
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U.S. Supreme Court. Those appellate courts rejected many challenges for two main
reasons: the lawsuits were too late under the Purcell Principle and the states should
enjoy deference on how to run their elections.232 But that deference is undue and
unwarranted under Supreme Court precedent and a proper understanding of the right
to vote as a cherished, fundamental right. The courts should rethink their approach
and rein in legislatures to ensure that voter access can remain as equal and robust as
possible. A refusal to change their jurisprudence provides even stronger reasons for
robust federal voting legislation and a new constitutional right to vote amendment.
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